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1. Summary of Tuna-Dolphin II and the Panel decision (this summary derives from Howse 
and Levy, 2013) 
In Tuna, Mexico challenged a US measure that monitored and enforced a private voluntary 
label on tuna, the “dolphin-safe” label. While Mexico made some polemical claims that the US 
measure was “coercive” and was not in the spirit of international cooperation with respect to 
dolphin conservation under the AIDCP, a regional intergovernmental regime for dolphin 
protection, its more precise legal claims focused on two aspects of the US measure. First of all, 
as interpreted by the US Courts, the US legal framework required the prohibition of the use of 
the label on tuna marketed in the United States in any instance where the tuna was caught by a 
method involving encircling or setting upon dolphins. This method is attractive to tuna fishers in 
the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP), where Mexican boats fish for tuna, because in that region 
dolphins are known to swim with tuna. Mexico argued that by not allowing tuna fished in this 
way to be certified as dolphin-safe, even if no actual dolphin was killed despite the encircling or 
setting upon of dolphins, the United States violated 2.1 of TBT; since this was a method typically 
used by Mexican fishers, not allowing it to qualify for “dolphin-safe” labeling de facto limited 
the competitive opportunities for Mexican tuna in the United States.  
Secondly, Mexico claimed that while the United States had a strict monitoring and 
enforcement scheme for tuna originating in the ETP, with respect to tuna fished outside the ETP, 
the United States allowed the label “dolphin safe” to be used based upon the self-declaration of 
the captain of the fishing vessel that no dolphins had been set upon and no dolphins killed. 
Mexico did produce some credible evidence that there was genuine harm to dolphins from tuna-
fishing outside the ETP, thus putting into question the justification for treating tuna from the two 
geographic regions so different. Since the United States made a distinction based upon 
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geographical origin of the tuna, requiring much stricter regulatory enforcement within the ETP, 
the area where Mexican tuna was sourced, Mexico argued that there was a national-treatment 
violation. The Panel tended to conflate these rather different claims into a single claim of de 
facto discrimination with respect to the requirement of not setting on dolphins. While finding 
that Mexican “tuna” and US “tuna” were like products, the Panel rejected the conflated claim, 
based on the observation that at the time the measure was introduced, both US and Mexican 
fishing boats were using the method of setting upon dolphins, and thus the initial competitive 
effect on US and Mexican tuna of the banning of this method was the same. The choice of US 
fishers to avoid the method in order to be able to have their tuna certified as dolphin-safe and the 
Mexican fishers not to do so was a business decision, and did not reflect any lack of even-
handedness in the requirement itself.  
A threshold issue in the Tuna case was whether the US measure fell within the definition 
of a “technical regulation” given that it was not a mandatory labeling scheme; there was no 
requirement that tuna be labeled for dolphin safety (or unsafety). The measure merely ensured 
that when the claim “dolphin-safe” was made, certain criteria were followed that provided an 
adequate assurance that dolphins were not being killed or hurt. Even though, to use the precise 
definitional terms of “technical regulation” in TBT, the US measure did not make the 
characteristic in question – “dolphin safety” – mandatory for the product, which was defined as 
“tuna” to be marketed in the United States, the Panel found that the measure was a technical 
regulation because it had some mandatory features.  
Mexico also argued that there was a violation of TBT 2.2 because the US objective of 
informing consumers and protecting dolphins could be achieved if the United States were to 
permit both the label that it was now, in effect, imposing as the sole label and the alternative 
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AIDCP dolphin-safe label, the latter allowing tuna to be caught in setting upon dolphins. 
According to Mexico, consumers could make an informed choice and if they wanted to ensure 
that tuna was not caught through setting upon dolphins, they could always choose the label 
certifying to that effect. The Panel held that, while having both labels freely available could 
create consumer confusion, it would be a less-trade- restrictive alternative provided that this 
confusion was avoided through a requirement that the label on each can of tuna be accompanied 
by explanatory language that indicated the precise claims behind the particular label at issue. It is 
surprising that the Panel would find a violation of 2.2 based on the failure to adopt this 
information-intensive least- restrictive alternative of explanatory tuna labels, since it was never 
proposed by Mexico, and never discussed in the pleadings or the hearings.  
Finally, Mexico claimed that the United States was in violation of TBT 2.4 because it did 
not use the AIDCP alternative labeling scheme as a basis for its regulation. Mexico argued that 
the AIDCP was an international standard within the meaning of TBT 2.4. The Panel held that the 
AIDCP was an international standardization body, even though it is a regional organization to 
which only a small subset of WTO adhere, because at a particular point in time in the history of 
this organization there was a possibility for interested states outside the region to join it as parties 
to the treaty (this window had long passed). However, the Panel ultimately determined that there 
was no violation based on the finding that the standard was inappropriate and ineffective to 
achieve the US objective, since that objective concerned avoiding harms to dolphins explicitly 
connected to the technique of setting upon them such as stress and trauma.     
The Appellate Body upheld the panel’s finding that the US measure constituted a 
“technical regulation”; reversed the Panel’s finding of a violation of TBT 2.2 and significantly 
altered its analysis of 2.1 and 2.4, but ultimately found a violation of 2.1; given the rather sharp 
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discrepancy of treatment in the US scheme between tuna fished in the ETP (the operating zone of 
Mexican tuna fishers) and outside the ETP, the AB held that there was a lack of evenhandedness, 
constituting a violation of 2.1 based upon the methodology it had set out in Cloves.  
 
2. Legal Analysis of Tuna-Dolphin II  AB 
2.1 The definition of a technical regulation 
 
The first paragraph of Annex I of the TBT Agreement defines a "technical regulation" as a 
"document that lays down product characteristics or their related processes and production 
methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, compliance with which is 
mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, 
marking or labeling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method." 
The TBT Agreement also applies to standards, which have a similar content to technical 
regulations, except that they are not mandatory. 
 
Further, the TBT Agreement also applies to measures that assess the conformity of a product or 
its processing and production methods either with technical regulations or standards 
 
The US measure in this case did not require that tuna sold in the US not be caught by setting 
upon dolphins with purse-sein nets.  Nor did the measure require that tuna be labeled "dolphin-
friendly" if it met the criteria in question or "dolphin-unfriendly" if it did not.  Thus, the US 
measure was not obviously a description of a process and production method with which 
compliance is mandatory.  Nor was it obviously a "labeling requirement", i.e. in the ordinary 
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meaning that the measure mandates that a product be labeled in a certain way.  Nevertheless, the 
AB upheld the panel majority in finding that the US measure was a "technical regulation." 
 
There were a number of steps that led the AB to what we regard as this fundamentally erroneous 
finding.  The first was that, relying on the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the AB chose a 
definition of requirement-"a condition that must be complied with"-that allowed it to engage in 
the glissage that labeling requirements mean the conditions for the use of a label even if its use is 
itself voluntary, rather than that labeling is a condition on the importing, sale, marketing for sale 
etc. of the product. (Para. 186) Clearly the OED definition is compatible with either meaning of 
"condition".  Therefore, the AB should have gone further and considered "condition" in the 
context of the TBT Agreement as a whole in the one way or the other.  Here, since TBT is a lex 
specialis to Article III:4 of the GATT, it is highly pertinent that Article III:4 contains the word 
"requirements" and that at the time of the negotiation of the TBT Agreement there was an 
extensive jurisprudence on the meaning of the phrase "laws, regulations and requirements" and 
that clearly the understanding was that this refers to measures the mandate the action in question, 
on pain of legal penalty or through some kind of government inducement.  The US measure in 
Tuna II was clearly not a requirement in this sense since the use of a label was not mandated in 
the measure. 
 
Perhaps understandably insecure about its interpretation of "labeling requirements", the AB then 
went on to admit that the US measure had some features of a "standard" as well as of a "technical 
regulation" in that it did not mandate the use of the "dolphin-friendly" designation, but only that 
certain conditions be met in order that its voluntary use be permissible.  (Para. 188) 
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What appeared to tip the balance for the AB was that the US measure did not merely require that 
in order for a particular voluntary dolphin-friendly  label to be used certain conditions be met, 
but that the US scheme went further and prohibited any alternative voluntary label or labeling 
scheme that made any representation concerning the tuna in question and the effects on dolphins 
of its production. (Para. 193)  This is certainly a more nuanced approach to that of the panel, 
which seemed to suggest that even governmental involvement in conformity assessment 
concerning a voluntary standard is a "technical regulation" even where the only mandatory 
element is the stipulation that the product must not be represented as meeting the standard when 
it is not in conformity. 
 
But the AB approach is still flawed.  The requirement that tuna not be misrepresented as dolphin-
safe, even through an alternative label, simply should not engage the same level of state 
responsibility under the TBT Agreement as where the government is giving producers no choice 
but to use a certain label.  The level of justification of a "technical regulation" required under 
TBT 2.2 makes the Member fully for the overall labeling scheme, supposing that its preparation, 
adoption and application is in the hands of the state.  This is a very different matter than the state 
merely controlling the veracity of representations private economic actors may or may not 
choose to make.  We emphasize that this does not mean there is no state responsibility nor does it 
mean there is no mandatory element.  It only means that the proper level of responsibility is that 
which pertains to conformity with a voluntary standard.  Often courts under common law 
doctrine in common law countries, or generally, under general consumer statues, will find legal 
liability for product claims the substance of which is completely unrelated to any governmental 
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regulatory activity.  It seems virtually absurd to attribute to the state actions and omissions in the 
preparation or adoption or application of the standard or substantive norm on which 
a  representation is based, just because legal liability attaches to misleading or deceiving 
consumers by the representation in question.  Again we emphasize that state action to prevent 
consumer confusion or misinformation is subject to WTO norms, both under GATT and to some 
extent TBT.  It is just that government mandating a certain substantive norm concerning a 
product or its production processes is very different fromgovernment limiting itself to preventing 
consumers from being misled or deceived.  One may of course question whether the language by 
which the measure sought to prohibit claims of dolphin-friendliness that did not meet the criteria 
for the dominant labeling scheme was overbroad in light of its objectives, and that the 
government was not merely controlling misrepresentation but tipping the balance in favor of one 
substantive normative scheme over another.  But these kinds of considerations could properly be 
dealt with in applying GATT Article III;4 and the disciplines of the TBT Agreement on 
conformity assessment. 
 
Ultimately, one should perhaps not be too critical of the AB, or at least hopeful that is will 
distinguish Tuna II, in subsequent jurisprudence, on the basis that while voluntary there was 
considerable real world entanglement of the US authorities and private actors in the functioning 
of the particular labeling scheme in question. On these facts, it is not entirely unreasonable that 
the AB would have held the US to a high level of state responsibility, one would like to think 
that would be the case where government is controlling the veracity or clarity of private sector 
representations, but completely at arm’s length from any particular voluntary labeling scheme 
that private actors have adopted. 
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2.2 "Product-related PPMs" 
 
It has often been assumed that the expression in Annex I, para. I, "product characteristics or their 
related processes and production methods" indicates the technical regulations do not include 
PPMs that leave the physical characteristics of the product unaffected.  There was in fact no 
textual-or contextual-reason to assume that "characteristics" means only physical 
characteristics.  In the case of US-Tuna, the characteristic at issue, dolphin friendliness, is not a 
physical characteristic.  Notably, in determining whether the US measure was a technical 
regulation, the AB never even considered the notion that "characteristic" might mean physical 
characteristic.  And indeed there was no reason for the AB to consider notions invented by 
academic and other commentators, however widespread the canard. 
 
Since the AB gave no thought to the idea of imposing on the expression "characteristic" a 
restrictive meaning completely unsupported by the text, it did not have to consider the 
significance of the difference between the first and second sentence of the definitional paragraph 
of Annex 1 in regard to PPMs.  The second sentence applies to packaging and  "labeling 
requirements" and refers to PPMs without the qualifier in para. 1 that they relate to the 
characteristics of the product.  Had the AB found for example that "characteristics" in the first 
sentence of 2.1 meant physical characteristics, it would then have had to  address whether, unlike 
the case for other technical regulations, PPMs in respect to labeling requirements need not be 
related to physical characteristics of products.  Without such a finding the AB would have been 
compelled to the conclusion that the entire US measure falls outside the definition of a technical 
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regulation.  Had the AB restricted "characteristics" in the first sentence to physical characteristics 
and yet found (as hypothesized) that in the case of a labeling requirement a PPM  need not be 
related to product characteristics, it would then have had to restrict its consideration under TBT 
to the aspect of the measure that fell within its definition of labeling requirement, namely 
conditions to be met to conform to the description in the particular label, "dolphin-friendly." Yet 
recall that the aspect of government involvement that convinced the AB that the measure was a 
technical regulation, was the prohibition on any alternative representation or claim concerning 
the impact on dolphins of the tuna in question.  This purportedly broad prohibition is different 
from a labeling requirement as the AB sees it.  And indeed elsewhere in its report the AB refers 
to the description of a technical regulation in the first sentence in the defining para of Annex 1, 
confirming that it is addressing aspects of the US measure beyond those denoted by the 
description in the second sentence. 
 
By simply accepting that "characteristics" in the first sentence is not confined to physical 
characteristics, the AB has thus left unresolved two puzzles. What does in fact product-related 
mean in the first sentence, and why does it not qualify the reference to PPMs in the second 
sentence. To the first question, there is a rather straightforward answer.  TBT is an agreement 
that concerns traded goods and their competitive opportunities.  PPMs that do not relate to a 
specific traded good cannot be the focus of a complaint under TBT.  Thus, where a PPM 
measure concerns trade in services (for example norms regarding how engineers and architects 
design a nuclear power plant that affect competitive opportunities of such service providers from 
other WTO members), TBT does not apply; the complaint is not concerning competitive 
opportunities for traded goods.  Similarly a complaint concerning a WTO Member's exclusion 
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from patenting of a certain process, where it does not concern competitive opportunities for the 
resulting product in the regulating Member's market would normally be addressed under TRIPs 
not TBT. 
There is however a class of PPMs that do not relate to the characteristics of a specific product 
strictly speaking but do relate to its competitive opportunities in the market of the regulating 
Member.  Take for example a requirement that the production of the packaging of a good not 
result in certain levels of toxic waste.  The package is separable from any characteristic of the 
good, physical or otherwise, but specifying its manner of production can affect the marketing, 
sale etc. of the product in the regulating Member's territory. A similar case is a requirement that a 
particular methodology or instrument be used to calculate the volume or weight of a product for 
purposes of labeling.  We can see here clearly why the drafters needed to use different language 
concerning PPMs in the second sentence than the first.  But the intent not to apply TBT where a 
PPM is unconnected to a traded product including the conditions of its marketing and sale seems 
fairly clear. 
 
Some have suggested the rather nonsensical reading that by virtue of sentence one only PPMs 
related to physical characteristics are disciplined by TBT, whereas in the case of labeling, etc. 
under the second sentence all PPMs are disciplined.  This would lead to the absurd, or at least 
highly counterintuitive, result that a highly trade restrictive measure such as a ban based on a 
non-product related PPM would not be left entirely undisciplined as a technical regulation, 
whereas less trade restrictive labeling requirements would. 
 
2.3  National Treatment/MFN (TBT 2.2) 
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The like products analysis of the panel was not appealed by the United States and therefore the 
AB did not address it.  The panel had found that the relevant universe of like products was "tuna" 
or products containing tuna.  Given the comments by the Appellate Body in Clove Cigarettes 
about the importance of defining correctly the product universe in light of the precise claim of 
discrimination by the complainant, one may well question whether the panel came to a correct 
finding here.  The competitive relationship being asserted by Mexico was between Mexican tuna 
caught in purse seine nets but otherwise qualifying as dolphin-friendly under the US labeling 
scheme and US or other tuna not caught in purse seine nets.  Mexico was not arguing that from 
the perspective of competition all tuna is the same, whether dolphin-friendly or not.  This would 
indeed have been to the detriment of its case, which was premised on the notion that, because 
consumers do distinguish dolphin-friendly and unfriendly-tuna and do not treat them as like 
products, access to the dolphin-friendly designation provides important competitive 
opportunities.   
 
Following the approach it set out in US-Clove Cigarettes, the AB considered that the 
determination of whether there was treatment less favourable of imported Mexican tuna should 
begin with the consideration of whether the US measure altered the conditions of competition 
between domestic US and imported Mexican tuna to the detriment of the imports.  If such a 
detrimental impact were found, then it would still be open to the defendant to show that the 
impact was exclusively due to a legitimate regulatory distinction and thus did not amount to 
discrimination within the meaning of Article 2.1, interpreted in light of object and purpose of 
TBT as disclosed in the Preamble to the agreement. 
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The panel below had found that the requirement that dolphins not be set upon with purse seine 
nets was national origin-neutral and did not result in the alteration of the conditions of 
competition between domestic US and imported Mexican tuna because Mexican operators could 
have the same access to the US market as domestic operators simply through complying with the 
national-origin neutral condition of not setting upon dolphins with purse seine nets. 
 
The Appellate Body rightly criticized this analysis as too simplistic (para. 225).  The mere fact 
that a condition is, on its face, national origin-neutral is no guarantee that it actually operates in 
an origin-neutral manner.  For example, a facially origin-neutral requirement may in fact be 
determined in such a manner as to establish conditions of competition that favor domestic 
operators and deny competitive opportunities to imports.  As the AB noted, the approach of the 
panel would amount to reversing the long-standing jurisprudence that national treatment 
disciplines extend to de facto discrimination.  At the same time the AB did not say that every 
differential impact that results from the operation of an origin-neutral measure constitutes in 
itself a detrimental impact pointing to a finding of treatment less favourable.  Rather each such 
impact must be assessed as potentially relevant to whether there is treatment less favourable.  
Thus, in the Dominican-Republic   Cigarettes case the AB considered a lump-sum bond or 
deposit requirement on cigarettes that the complainant argued imposed a higher per unit cost on 
foreign cigarette operators.  The AB found that this requirement did not alter the conditions of 
competition to the detriment imports because the higher per unit cost was simply a function of 
the fact that there were lower sales of foreign cigarettes as opposed to domestic cigarettes.  
Assuming that this situation was due only to current market conditions and not to any actions of 
the defending state, the AB found that even though there was a disparate impact this impact did 
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not amount to de facto discrimination.  In Tuna II, the AB expresses this through the notion of 
evenhandedness.  A scheme may lack evenhandedness even in its design and structure even if it 
does not contain any explicit, facial distinctions based on the national origin of products, such 
that as a formal matter both domestic and imported products have access to the same competitive 
opportunities.  An example of a measure that did not impose explicit national origin-based 
conditions but nevertheless lacked even handedness is to be found in one of the earliest GATT 
cases addressing de facto discrimination, the Canada-Beer case.  Certain  Canadian provinces set 
a minimum price requirement for beer-both domestic and imported US beer sold at or above that 
minimum price was equally eligible to be sold in the markets in question.  However, the 
minimum price itself was determined according to a benchmark that used computations based on 
the costs of domestic brewers, which were relatively higher than costs of competing US brewers.  
This had the effect of denying to the US brewers the ability to exploit their distinctive advantage 
of low cost structures in competing in the Canadian provincial markets.  This is a perfect 
illustration of how a measure can on its face be origin-neutral but have elements of non-
evenhandedness buried or entrenched in its structure and operation.      
 
The AB having (in our view correctly) reversed the panel for curtly assuming that, where 
detrimental impact does not derive from facially origin-based distinctions, there cannot be 
discrimination in the relevant sense, the question is whether the AB itself moved too quickly to 
the conclusion that the purse seine net requirement pointed to the kind of non-evenhandedness 
that would amount to de facto discrimination (para. 235).  In what way was the requirement not 
to use the purse-seine method inherently tilted in favour of domestic  tuna to the disadvantage of 
Mexican imports?  Is there some intrinsic obstacle to Mexican fishers abandoning the use of 
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purse seine nets that explains why they are still used?  The mere fact that Mexican fishers have 
not abandoned purse seine nets while US fishers have, does not seem sufficient.  Thus, the 
Appellate Body itself notes at paras. 206-207 of its report that the panel found as a fact that both 
US and Mexican fishers set upon dolphins with purse seine nets at the time the US measure was 
introduced; US fishers changed their practices but Mexican fishers chose not to.  While the 
panel's legal analysis may have been faulty, in appearing to suggest that only facially national-
origin related differential treatment is relevant, the panel made the important factual finding  that 
"any particular adverse impact felt by Mexican tuna products on the US market" was "primarily 
the result of factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product."(emphasis 
added: para. 7.378).  Given that the AB did not conclude that this factual determination was 
tainted by any violation of DSU 11, it is completely obscure why the AB came to a preliminary 
conclusion of de facto discrimination in this case.  If one accepts the factual finding of the panel, 
then the result would logically have to be the same as in Dominican Republic-Cigarettes.  
Indeed, one reason that the panel may have not explicitly addressed de facto discrimination is 
that it found no facts that pointed to hidden, indirect or structural discrimination.  But the 
sentence just cited from the panel report indicates that the panel certainly at least turned its mind 
to whether such facts existed.    In sum, the AB inferred a "detrimental impact" from the mere 
fact that Mexican and US fishers currently have different practices concerning setting on 
dolphins with purse seine nets,  Contrary to the AB's own methodology, set out in this report as 
well as in Dominican Republic-Cigarettes, the AB failed to consider if, or explain why, the 
differential impact resulted from lack of evenhandedness in the US measure. It is probably 
impossible to design a regulation that is completely neutral in its competitive effects on diverse 
economic actors, domestic and foreign.   This cannot be the meaning of "evenhandedness".  
16 
 
Rather, it is important to look, as the AB did in cases as old as Chile-Alcohol and as recent as 
Dominican Republic-Cigarettes, at whether the differential impact results from features of the 
design and structure of the scheme that are tilted or skewed somehow in favour of domestic 
production.  This might be the case, for example, if a fishing technique were required that was, 
due to climatic or geographical conditions, inherently un-viable in the waters where the Mexican 
industry had organized itself to fish.  But there were no finding of fact in the panel report that 
pointed to any such situation. 
 
In any case, having found a detrimental impact, the AB went on to consider whether that impact 
was exclusively attributable to a legitimate regulatory distinction.   The AB defined the 
detrimental impact in this section of its report rather differently than what we have just seen in 
the immediately prior section:  "The aspect of the measure that causes the detrimental impact on 
Mexican tuna products is ... the difference in labeling conditions for tuna products containing 
tuna caught by setting on dolphins in the ETP, on the one hand, and for tuna products containing 
tuna caught by other fishing methods outside the ETP, on the other hand."(para. 284)    At this 
point, the AB seems to actually be proposing a theory of non-evenhandedness that, as we had 
noted, seemed lacking in the immediately prior analysis, namely that the detrimental impact is 
not simply due to   the no-purse seine requirement in and of itself but rather the operation of the 
scheme so as to allow access to the label for competing producers who put dolphins at risk 
through other fishing techniques in other waters where the Mexican industry does not operate.  In 
other words, the non-evenhandedness comes from the design and structure of the scheme, which 
focuses on threats to dolphins in the ETP through techniques used by the Mexican fishers and 
ignoring threats from other fishing practices in other waters. 
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While the US scheme established that setting on dolphins with purse-seine nets was incompatible 
with the dolphin-safe label, whether in the ETP or elsewhere, outside the ETP it was possible for 
the captain of the boat to self-certify that this practice was not being used, whereas in the ETP 
the certification of an independent observer on the boat was required.  Moreover, outside the 
ETP access to the dolphin-safe designation was possible without any certification that dolphins 
had not been killed in the process of fishing the tuna in question.  
 
The US sought to justify these disparities by the fact that association of tuna and dolphins is rare 
outside the ETP, and evidence of dolphin mortality not strong enough, to justify the costs of 
requiring certification as a precondition to use of the dolphin-safe designation.  Mexico presented 
some studies that indicated some evidence of tuna fishing-associated, or at least fishing-
associated dolphin mortality outside the ETP.  The validity and significance of this evidence was 
strongly contested in the panel proceedings. 
 
Ultimately, the Appellate Body concluded that the full discrepancy between the treatment of ETP 
and non-ETP tuna could not be exclusively attributed to a legitimate regulatory distinction.  The 
AB partly accepted and partly rejected the US cost/benefit argument.  It accepted that the much 
greater threat to dolphins in the ETP could justify the requirement of independent observers in 
the ETP (footnote 612 and accompanying text) while relying on self-certification (captain's 
certification) outside the ETP with respect to the non-purse seine net requirement.   But the AB 
rejected the cost/benefit argument with respect to the absence of any certification concerning 
non-dolphin-mortality from other fishing methods outside the ETP.  This rejection was based 
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entirely on the observation that (just as with the no-purse seine net rule outside the ETP) it would 
be possible to use captain's certification with respect to dolphin non-mortality from other fishing 
methods (para. 296).  Thus, requiring certification concerning dolphin non-morality outside the 
ETP did not entail requiring independent observers on each boat.  In this sense, the AB was able 
to accept the US argument that greater rigor in certification was justified in the case of the ETP 
given the significantly greater threats to dolphins, while rejecting the notion that paying no 
attention whatever to dolphin-mortality from other fishing techniques outside the ETP was fully 
justified by the legitimate US concerns of dolphin protection and consumer information, given 
the different level of risks in the ETP and outside the ETP.   
 
It is not surprising therefore that the US has proposed to implement the AB decision by  
requiring non-ETP captain's certification of dolphin non-mortality from fishing methods other 
than setting on dolphins.  This pinpoints the precise concern that led the AB to find a violation of 
2.1.  It does not reduce in any way the effectiveness of the scheme in relation to the ETP-rightly 
the main concern of both consumers and the US government-and it might result in some 
additional dolphin lives being saved, at relatively modest cost.  At the same time, 
jurisprudentially, the AB needs to articulate with greater clarity the steps by which de facto 
discrimination is established under the National Treatment obligation, whether in GATT or TBT.  
One can agree with the AB that all evidence of disparate impact of a measure on competing 
foreign producers is relevant to assessment of whether de facto discrimination exists, but the 
question is how this evidence is to be weighed and evaluated in relation to the structure and 
design of the measure in order to come to an overall conclusion as to whether in the AB's words 
there is a lack of "evenhandedness."  We have pointed out the apparent inconsistencies in the 
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AB’s own articulation of "detrimental impact" in this report, as well as tensions with the way in 
which the evidence was weighed and evaluated in Dominican Republic-Cigarettes. 
 
A final note.  After Clove Cigarettes, there was much discussion and speculation on whether the 
AB approach of considering whether detrimental impact is attributable exclusively to a 
legitimate regulatory distinction would apply equally or at least mutatis mutandis to Article III:4 
of the GATT.   In Tuna II, the AB appears to take an integrated approach to the analysis of 
discrimination under TBT and GATT, in no way indicating that the analytics it is using are 
specific to TBT.  Thus the AB applies without qualification or distinction that jurisprudential 
acquis on National Treatment in the GATT to the analysis under 2.1.  There is no reason why a 
responding Member could not argue that under Article III of the GATT that, despite features of 
the design and structure of its measure appearing to be non-evenhanded in their impact on 
competing imported products, these features can in fact be fully explained by a legitimate 
regulatory distinction.  Indeed, applying the second sentence of Article III:2 in Chile-Alcohol 
(which reflects the overall object and purpose of National Treatment, expressed both III:1 of 
GATT and the Preamble of TBT), the AB justified its finding of de facto discrimination in that 
case by Chile's ultimate failure precisely to explain the design features of its scheme in terms of 
distinctions arising from legitimate regulatory objectives.            
 
2.4 “Unnecessary Obstacle to Trade” (TBT 2.2) 
Article 2.2 reads: 
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Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or 
applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the 
risks non-fulfillment would create. Such legitimate objects are, inter alia: national 
security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human 
health or safety; animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing 
such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific 
and technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of 
products.  
 
The various qualifications on the substantive criterion of necessity – for example (‘taking 
account of the risks non-fulfillment would create’) least trade-restrictive – distinguish the TBT 
Agreement from Article XX of the GATT, which provides a means of justifying measures that 
have already been found to violate some provision of the GATT. Since it is not a matter of 
‘saving’ measures that have already been impugned, the burden of proof is logically on the 
complainant to show that a less-restrictive alternative does exist, which would fulfill the 
defending Member’s legitimate objective.  
Under 2.2, the obligation to ensure the least-trade-restrictiveness of regulations is relative 
to the kinds of risks that would arise in the absence of the regulations. Deliberation about the 
choice of regulatory instrument can be a costly and time-consuming process. How far a Member 
should be expected to go in exhausting all the regulatory alternatives to find the least-trade-
restrictive alternative is logically related to the kind of risk it is dealing with. Where what is at 
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stake is a well-established risk to human life itself, a Member may be expected to act rapidly, 
rely on the scientific acquis to a large extent, and tend towards the more obviously effective and 
enforceable kinds of regulatory tools, as opposed to the more sophisticated and speculative ones.  
It is important to note that Article 2.2 explicitly lists among the relevant elements of 
consideration in assessing risk ‘available scientific and technical information.’ This suggests that 
a WTO Member is not required to adopt or even explore a less-restrictive alternative that has not 
been shown as effective in achieving its legitimate objective on the basis of existing scientific 
and other relevant information.  
 Generally speaking, the parties and the panel approached the application of TBT 2.2 
based on the existing jurisprudence of GATT Article XX.  Thus, the analysis revolved around 
the question of whether there was a reasonably available less-trade-restrictive alternative 
measure that could make an equivalent contribution to the US chosen level of protection.  The 
panel found that  the extent to which the US measure fulfilled the objectives of dolphin 
protection and consumer information was limited in that the measure provided little real 
assurance to consumers that tuna caught outside the ETP was in fact dolphin-safe (this concerns 
features of the US measure we discussed above in connection with the analysis of TBT 2.1).   
Since the assurances of dolphin-safety under the US measure were incomplete or imperfect, the 
panel reasoned, an alternative measure could also involve incomplete or imperfect assurances of 
dolphin-safety while still making an equivalent contribution to the US chosen level of protection.     
 On this basis the panel considered Mexico’s argument that “A less trade restrictive way 
of fulfilling the objectives would be to create dolphin safe standards rather than a technical 
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regulation . . .”3 (In other words, the US objectives can be fulfilled by the operation of voluntary 
standards by the various labeling and certification schemes, with no requirement of government 
action through technical regulations.) (Mexico, 2nd Written Submission, para. 210), emphasis 
added.  The basis for Mexico’s argument was its assertion in its first written submission to the 
panel that the operation of the AIDCP was making a sufficient contribution to the US objectives 
that no further intervention by the US government was necessary:  ““in the absence of the U.S. 
measures, the preservation of dolphin stocks in the ETP fishery will continue to be accomplished 
by the requirements and procedures of AIDCP.”(Mexico, First Written Submission, para. 244, 
emphasis added).   Mexico’s argument would only be plausible, if the US level of protection 
could be inferred from the features of its scheme that disclose limited concern for the 
achievement of dolphin-safety (namely, the relative lack of enforcement of dolphin-safety 
standards outside the ETP). In some sense, Mexico’s argument entails not so much the proposal 
of an alternative measure but the assertion that the US measure makes no contribution at all to 
the achievement of its chosen level of protection (using the non-ETP baseline) since that level of 
protection (within the ETP) is already being achieved through the AIDCP.   The panel, 
however, did not base its finding of a violation on the comparison of the US measure with the 
alternative proposed by Mexico (no US technical regulation but continued operation of the 
AIDCP regime) but rather on a comparison with a very different alternative that the panel itself 
constructed.  The panel’s concern with Mexico’s proposal of no US government involvement is 
that it could result in two voluntary labels, the US one and the AIDCP one, operating side by side 
in the marketplace, with the result of consumer confusion, and thus non-fulfillment of the US 
consumer information objective.  Thus, the panel made up something different. In paragraph 
7.575 of its Report, the Panel described and found to be less restrictive of trade and capable of 
                                                            
3 Second Written Submission of the Mexican States, para. 210. (Emphasis added.) 
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fulfilling the US legitimate objectives, an alternative regulatory scheme with the following 
features: The United States would continue to ensure compliance with the “dolphin-safe” 
designation but instead would permit two separate labeling and certification schemes, each of 
which defined “dolphin-safe” in a somewhat different manner. The labels in each case would be 
required to disclose to consumers the relevant meaning of “dolphin safe” that corresponded to 
the particular tuna in question. 
 The Appellate Body in its approach to TBT 2.2 confirmed that the analysis of whether the 
measure conforms to the requirements of 2.2 normally entails a consideration of whether there is 
a “possible alternative measure that is less trade restrictive, makes an equivalent contribution to 
the relevant objective, and is reasonably available.”(para. 323).  The AB also, noted, however, its 
jurisprudence in respect to Article XX of the GATT (Korea-Beef), that suggested that in some 
instances a measure might be “necessary” even though it is not “indispensable”(footnote 642).  If 
what the AB is suggesting in this footnote is that the same logic applies to the meaning(s) of 
necessity in TBT 2.2, then even if an alternative measure is identified that is found to be “less 
trade restrictive, makes an equivalent contribution to the relevant objective and is reasonably 
available” and thus the measure under scrutiny is not “indispensable” it would still be open to the 
responding Member to argue that while not “indispensable” it has a sufficiently close and 
proportionate relationship to the objective as to be “necessary”.  Finally, the AB identified at 
least two circumstances where there would be no need to proceed by way of a comparison with 
possible alternative measures, first where the measure made no contribution to the objective 
(which as noted, seemed to be Mexico’s actual argument in its written submissions to the panel 
in this case) or where the measure is not trade restrictive.(footnote 647).   
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 According to the AB the normal way of proceeding under 2.2 would be for the 
complainant to identify possible alternative measure(s), making a prima facie case that the 
alternative measure or measures is less trade restrictive, reasonably available and makes an 
equivalent contribution and then, in turn, for the responding Member to attempt to rebut this by 
showing that in fact the alternative measure does not have one or more of these features.   
 This brings us to the AB’s reversal of the panel’s finding of a violation of TBT 2.2.   
While, as noted, the panel’s finding of a violation was based on a possible alternative measure 
that the panel itself constructed, not the one identified by Mexico (that the panel found could 
lead to consumer confusion and non-fulfillment of the US consumer information objective).  
Confusingly, and arguably erroneously, the Appellate Body directed itself to the panel’s 
comparison of the alternative measure proposed by Mexico (para. 330), not the comparison that 
actually led to the panel’s finding of a violation.  The fundamental flaw that the AB saw in the 
comparison in question was that the panel focused on overall contribution of the US measure and 
the alternative measure, taking conditions in the ETP and non-ETP together (and thus, as noted 
above, that the US measure and the alternative measure each addressed imperfectly or 
incompletely the concerns in question).  Instead, since the AIDCP scheme does not apply outside 
the ETP, the AB said that the proper comparison was between the respective contributions of the 
two schemes to the US objectives with respect to the situation within the ETP.    Thus, the 
apparently lower level of protection or lesser achievement of its objectives acceptable to the US 
inferred from its treatment of non-ETP tuna would be irrelevant to any proper comparison.  The 
appropriate way for the AB to have proceeded would have been to make clear it was reversing 
the panel finding of a violation of 2.2 based solely upon its failure to restrict its comparison to 
the ETP, and then having so reversed, that it was completing the analysis.  This would have 
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provided a clear jurisprudential basis for considering the alternative measure proposed by 
Mexico, not the one constructed by the panel on which it found a violation of 2.2.      
Comparing the contribution of the US measure and the alternative proposed by Mexico to US 
objectives within the ETP, the AB held as follows:  We note, in this regard, the Panel's finding, 
undisputed by the participants, that dolphins suffer adverse impact beyond observed mortalities 
from setting on dolphins, even under the restrictions contained in the AIDCP rules.  Since under 
the proposed alternative measure tuna caught in the ETP by setting on dolphins would be eligible 
for the "dolphin-safe" label, it would appear, therefore, that the alternative measure proposed by 
Mexico would contribute to both the consumer information objective and the dolphin protection 
objective to a lesser degree than the measure at issue, because, overall, it would allow more tuna 
harvested in conditions that adversely affect dolphins to be labeled "dolphin-safe". 
 
 We note first of all that, having incorrectly substituted the comparison suggested by 
Mexico for the comparison on the basis of which the panel actually found a violation of 2.2, the 
AB seemed even to misconstrue Mexico’s proposed comparison.  As the passage just cited 
indicates, the AB appears to have understood Mexico’s suggested alternative as that the US 
would, under its scheme, make the “dolphin-safe” label available to all tuna caught in accordance 
with the AIDCP rules.  But this is not what Mexico was proposing either in its first or second 
submission.  Instead, Mexico’s alternative was that the US withdraw from establishing and 
enforcing the criteria for “dolphin-safety” altogether.  This would leave the US label as a US 
industry-supervised standard, while at the same time allowing the designation “dolphin-safe” for 
tuna fished in accordance with the alternative AIDCP scheme.  In our view, had the AB 
understood correctly the Mexican proposed alternative it would have been required to do a more 
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complex analysis to determine whether this alternative made an equivalent contribution to the 
US objectives.  The beginning point of such an analysis would necessarily be a prediction of how 
the alternative measure would affect consumer behavior.   The co-existence of two schemes, 
neither of which is monitored and enforced by the US government, might have a number of 
possible effects on consumers.  Consumers concerned with dolphin safety might be confused by 
the existence of two different labels with the same designation “dolphin-safe” and possibly 
different meanings to the claim of dolphin-safety, and they might respond by switching from 
tuna to substitute products (the empirical evidence is that this is precisely what US consumers 
did when problems of dolphin mortality first arose and until their confidence was won in the US 
“dolphin-safe” label.)4   If this were to occur, then the US dolphin protection goals would be 
fulfilled perhaps to an even greater extent than with the existing measure.  However, the 
consumer information goal would be undermined, as consumers would not feel confident that 
they had the information they required to exercise their preference to eat dolphin-safe tuna and 
thus would choose between two alternatives each less attractive, eating tuna that might well not 
be dolphin-safe, or giving up on tuna.  Some consumers, even if not confused, might have 
insufficient confidence in labels not backed by US government monitoring and enforcement, 
such that they also would switch out of tuna.   Such possible effects are relevant  to whether the 
alternative measure would be less trade restrictive.  A measure that has the effect of reducing 
sales of tuna both domestic and imported seems more not less restrictive of trade in tuna.   An 
alternative, more optimistic view is that the co-existence of two non-governmentally verified 
                                                            
4 Teisl, Mario F., Brian Roe, and Robert L. Hicks (2002), “Can Eco-Labels Tune a Market?  
Evidence from Dolphin-Safe Labeling,” Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 43(3): 339–359.  
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labeling schemes would provide more refined or better information to consumers, allowing them 
to make choices that more exactly reflect their preferences.  Thus, it might be argued that there 
are some consumers in the US market who are concerned by dolphin mortality but not by the 
specific additive risks to dolphins from setting upon them with purse seine nets; these consumers 
would prefer tuna caught in accordance with the AIDCP rules if it cost less than tuna bearing the 
US “dolphin-safe” label (which does address the additional harm from setting on dolphins with 
purse seine nets).  The co-existence of the two labels enables an optimal welfare outcome for this 
particular group of consumers while still allowing an optimal outcome for those consumers who 
do care about the additional harmful impact from purse seine fishing, and would prefer to pay 
more for a credible assurance that the tuna they are eating is not fished in that way.  Thus, and 
this seems to have been the logic of Mexico’s argument, the alternative does better than the US 
measure in achieving the goal of consumer information or consumer protection.  On the other 
hand, if we consider the US dolphin protection goals, to the extent that the alternative empowers 
a group of consumers who are okay with dolphins being set upon with purse seine nets (or more 
precisely are unwilling to pay more to avoid this), it will result in higher demand for tuna caught 
using the purse seine technique, and therefore, at the margin, more harm to dolphins.  Thus, even 
if it makes an equivalent or greater contribution to the consumer information objective of the 
United States, the measure does not make an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the 
US dolphin-protection objective in the ETP. A Member is entitled to achieve all of the legitimate 
objectives: this is fundamental to the “right to regulate” under the TBT Agreement.  (See 
preamble at ??).  In its measures a Member is free to accept a lesser degree of fulfillment of one 
objective in order to achieve a greater degree of fulfillment of the other (where there is a trade-
off between them).  However, a Member cannot be required to accept a trade-off between the 
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fulfillment of two different objectives that the Member itself has not chosen.  Thus even if an 
alternative measure gave consumers more informed choices, if at the same time it led to a lesser 
degree of achievement of the dolphin protection objective, the US would not be violating 2.2 by 
failing to adopt the alternative.  To hold otherwise would, in effect, deny the sovereign right of a 
Member to determine its level of protection in respect of each objective.  
 In consequence, had the AB properly considered the comparison between Mexico’s 
proposed alternative and the US measure it would have come to the same conclusion that the US 
has not violated 2.2, since if the alternative measure had the effect of consumers switching out of 
tuna it would not make an equivalent contribution to the objective of informed consumer choice, 
while, if the alternative measure had the effect of some consumers switching from tuna not 
caught with purse seine methods to tuna caught with those methods, it would not make an 
equivalent contribution to the US dolphin protection objective. 
 
Finally, the AB considered Mexico’s appeal of the panel’s finding concerning “legitimate 
objective.” Mexico argued that the “United States' dolphin protection objective is a "coercive 
objective" because its purpose is to "coerce" another WTO Member to change its practices to 
comply with a unilateral policy of the United States.”(Para. 335)  The AB held that, to the extent 
that the US was concerned with “coercing” Mexico to change its policies, this was not an 
“objective” but a “means” to obtaining the US dolphin protection objective.  Mexico also argued 
that the US measure could not satisfy the requirements of 2.2 because it was inherently incapable 
of fully achieving the US objectives (this goes back to Mexico’s observations about the 
imperfect or incomplete approach to dolphin-mortality observable in the US treatment of non-
ETP tuna).  The AB held that a measure need only make some contribution or fulfill the 
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objectives to some extent.  This makes obvious sense.  A Member’s right to regulate, and in 
particular its ability to pursue other legitimate objectives that might require some limit to the 
degree to which it fulfills the objective in question, would be seriously undermined if it had to 
pursue the objective to a fanatical degree and without regard to costs and trade-offs, in order to 2 
(see Howse and Langille, “Permitting Pluralism”, Yale Journal of International Law, 2012.) 
 
2.5 “International Standards” (TBT 2.4) 
One of the key disciplines of the TBT Agreement is the obligation for WTO members to 
use relevant “international standards” as a “basis” for their technical regulations, unless the 
international standards are ineffective or inappropriate (Article 2.4). Yet international standards 
themselves are mostly of a voluntary nature and do not result, in most cases, in binding treaty 
commitments; quite a few of these standards are the creation of nongovernmental bodies, or 
private/public partnerships where industry is the driving force. By virtue of Article 2.4 of the 
TBT Agreement, a very broad range of normative material, including privately generated norms 
in some cases, is converted or transformed into an international legal obligation.  
In dicta in the EC–Sardines5 ruling, the Appellate Body has suggested that a “very strong and 
substantial” relationship may be required between domestic regulations and international 
standards to satisfy the obligation under TBT 2.4 to use international standards as a “basis”; the 
Appellate Body has clearly implied that international standards have considerable, automatic 
legal force in the WTO. The TBT Agreement nowhere defines international standards, nor does 
the Agreement attempt to list the international regimes that qualify to promulgate international 
standards within the meaning of TBT 2.4. 
                                                            
5 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, 
adopted 23 October 2002, DSR 2002:VIII, 3359. 
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In its consideration of Mexico’s claims under TBT 2.4, the Panel found that the AIDCP 
was an international standardization body, based in part on the determination that the AIDCP 
was “open” to all WTO Members. The Panel made the legal interpretation that openness to all 
WTO Members includes a situation where the existing members of a body may, at their 
discretion, decide to accept a WTO Member as a new member of that body.6 The Panel also 
suggested that the criterion of “openness could be fulfilled if, during a certain temporal window, 
all WTO Members had an opportunity to choose to join the body.7  
Not very surprisingly the Appellate Body reversed the finding of the panel that the AIDCP 
was a standardization body “open” to all WTO Members.  The AB acknowledged that, at their 
discretion the states parties to the AIDCP could “invite” a WTO Member to join the AIDCP, but 
was not persuaded that such an invitation was a mere formality, such that it would automatically 
follow from a WTO Member’s expression of interest in becoming a Member.  Thus the AIDCP 
is not “open” to all WTO Members as a matter of right.(Paras. 397-399).  There is an additional 
difficulty with the panel’s ruling which, however, the AB failed to address, but which is of 
considerable importance in understanding the scope of international standards within the 
meaning of TBT 2.4.  The relevant language in TBT defining an international standardization 
body in TBT, as noted, refers to openness to Membership not by all WTO Members but the 
standardization bodies of all WTO Members.  These bodies may be private industry or consumer 
bodies, mixed public/private entities, or state agencies or entities.  The AIDCP is a regional 
                                                            
6 Ibid. at para. 7.691 (“[T]he AIDCP remains open to accession to any State . . . that is invited to accede to 
the Agreement on  the basis of  the parties’ decision. To this day,  the AIDCP membership  is therefore open on a 
non‐discriminatory basis to the relevant bodies of at  least all WTO Members  in accordance with the principle of 
openness . . . .”). 
7 Ibid. (concluding that because the AIDCP membership was open from May 1998 until May 1999 to states 
whose vessels fished in the Agreement Area without restrictions on who could fish in the area, the AIDCP was open 
to all WTO Members).  
31 
 
treaty regime, and as such arguably only a state or another entity with international legal 
personality (such as an intergovernmental organization) could be a “member”-if indeed 
“member” means a party to the constitutive instrument of the regime.   Given that 
standardization bodies will often lack the international legal personality to join international 
organizations or treaty regimes, there is a risk that the extremely important standardization 
activities of international intergovernmental organizations (ranging from the WHO to the IAEA 
to the ILO) would not qualify as international standards within the meaning of TBT 2.4.  One 
solution would be to say that it is sufficient that every WTO Member be able to join the 
organization such that its standardization bodies, whether private, public or mixed can participate 
in the standardization work in question through the Member’s official delegation.  Here, 
however, there is the concern that a state might have different positions in an international 
intergovernmental organization than those of a non-state standardization body, and in any case 
would not want the activities or positions of the non-state body attributed to it.   So this solution 
is not perfect.  It also will not work, where the international intergovernmental organization 
permits only states to be members, since not all Members of the WTO are states (e.g. Hong 
Kong).8   
While reversing the panel on whether the AIDCP is “open” to all WTO Members, and 
failing to take account of the complexities just discussed, the AB did, to its credit, elaborate a 
broader framework for understanding the meaning of “international standards” in TBT 2.4, 
offering useful guidance to future panels. 
First of all, the AB held:   
 
a required element of the definition of an "international" standard 
for the purposes of the TBT Agreement is the approval of the standard by an "international 
                                                            
8 Howse thanks Gabrielle Marceau for a very useful discussion on this issue. 
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standardizing body", that is, a body that has recognized activities in standardization and whose 
membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members. As we see it, the different 
components of this definition inform each other. The interpretation of the term "international 
standardizing body" is therefore a holistic exercise in which the components of the definition are 
to be considered together. (Para. 359).    
 
Second, the AB noted:   
 
"standardizing body", that is, a body with 
"recognized activities in standardization", does not need to have standardization as its principal 
function, or even as one of its principal functions.714 At the same time, we note that the factual 
dimension of the concept of "recognition" would appear to require, at a minimum, that 
WTO Members are aware, or have reason to expect, that the international body in question is 
engaged in standardization activities. (Para. 362) 
 
 This is an important finding, because, subject to the difficulty discussed above concerning 
openness to standardization bodies of all WTO Members, it allows the standardization activities 
of international organizations the main mandate of which is not standardization to nevertheless 
be eligible as international standards within the meaning of TBT 2.4.  The same would be true of 
NGOs concerned with fair trade or sustainability, for example.   
Third, the AB found:   
 
the TBT Agreement also aims to encourage the development of international standards by bodies 
that were not already engaged  activities at the time of the adoption of the TBT Agreement. (Para. 
379)   
 
This is very important as international standards (codes of conduct) figure significantly in 
emerging issues such as sustainability of biofuels and deforestation, for example, the relevant 
bodies may well not have existed  prior to the creation of the WTO, especially NGOs. 
Fourth, and this is a finding with broad implications and jurisprudentially very bold: 
The TBT Committee Decision assists in the determination of whether an 
international body has "recognized activities in standardization". As an initial matter, we note 
that the TBT Committee Decision establishes principles and procedures that WTO Members 
have decided "should be observed" in the development of international standards. Evidence that 
an international body has followed the principles and procedures of the TBT Committee 
Decision in developing a standard would therefore be relevant for a determination of whether the 
body's activities in 
33 
 
standardization are "recognized" by WTO Members. More specifically, we recall that the word 
"recognize" is defined as "[a]cknowledge the existence, legality, or validity of, [especially] by 
formal 
approval or sanction; accord notice or attention to; treat as worthy of consideration"742 and that 
the 
concept of "recognition" has a factual and a normative dimension... other 
elements of the TBT Agreement, as well as the TBT Committee Decision, reflect the intent of 
WTO Members to ensure that the development of international standards take place transparently 
and 
with wide participation. The obligations and privileges associated with international standards 
pursuant to Articles 2.4 and 2.5 of the TBT Agreement further underscore the imperative that 
international standardizing bodies ensure representative participation and transparency in the 
development of international standards. In analyzing whether an entity is an "international 
standardizing body", a panel needs to balance these considerations. (Paras. 376, 379). 
The TBT Decision contains six principles, as Wijkstrom and McDaniels explain (2013)-of which 
the AB appears, as the passage just cited indicates, to give particular normative weight to 
participation and transparency.   The six are:  transparency:  including that all proposals and final 
results be “easily” accessible to all interested parties in all WTO Members; openness, including 
what would seem both de facto and de jure non-discriminatory participatory opportunities at all 
stages of standards development: impartiality and consensus; effectiveness and relevance 
(including prioritization of performance-based standards and a requirement not to give 
preference to needs or interests of particular counties and regions); coherence (including 
cooperation and coordination with other relevant international standardization bodies); 
facilitation of meaningful participation of developing countries. 
 The AB finding that the Decision is relevant to the determination of whether a 
standardization body not merely is “open” to all WTO Members but is engaged in “recognized” 
standardization activities-an absolute legal precondition to the standard being an international 
standard within the meaning of 2.4-implies that, since there is no list of “recognized” bodies or 
activities within the TBT Agreement itself, each time there is a claim concerning an 
“international standard” under TBT 2.4 the adjudicator must examine the extent to which the 
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body emitting that standard meets in its activities the requirements of the six principles (not just 
those directly related to the meaning of “openness”). 9 This is a profoundly qualitative exercise, 
obviously, that entails an evaluation of aspects that go well beyond the particular standard being 
invoked in the dispute.   This represents a major innovation in what Kingsbury and Stewart refer 
to as Global Administrative Law.  In effect the AB has transformed what would be at best the 
“soft law” of the Decision into a code of administrative procedure and practice for international 
standardization.      
 An extremely interesting question here is that of the dynamic effects on international 
standardization?  Will international standardization bodies seek to examine and possibly reform 
their operations in order that their standards qualify under TBT 2.4?  If so, the AB finding could 
well have the result of a considerable improvement in international standardization from the 
perspective of the values of Global Administrative Law.  On the other hand, it is possible that 
some WTO Members might want to avoid the standards of a particular standardization body 
being invoked under TBT 2.4.  In that instance, they might seek to ensure that the body in 
question does not operate in the manner required by the principles in the Decision. 
 More generally, given the significance now attached to the Decision by the AB, there is a 
need for more scholarly and policy analysis of the exact provisions of the Decision and whether 
particular standardization bodies can be understood to conform to them.      For example, what 
does it mean (under Effectiveness and relevance) that standards should not “distort the global 
market”?  Standards may be aimed at addressing externalities, solving information failures, or 
dealing with coordination problems.  The notion of not distorting global markets appears 
ideological, as if standards were not aimed at correcting already distorted global markets. 
                                                            
99  Wijkstrom and McDaniels (para. 3.24) appear to downplay  the far‐reaching significance of the AB finding 
concerning the Decision, seemingly ignoring or abstracting from the fact that in every case it will be necessary to 
establish that the body is “recognized” in the relevant sense. 
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 Finally the AB use of the TBT Committee Decision gave it an opportunity to clarify the 
role of such normative material within the framework for treaty interpretation established under 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  The AB took the view that 
the Decision was a “subsequent agreement” among the parties within the meaning of VCLT 31 
(3)(a).  This means that the adjudicator must take it into account where relevant, along with the  
“context”, as defined in VCLT 31(2).      
 
3.  Economic Analysis of Tuna-Dolphin II 
 
The Tuna-Dolphin II case raises a number of questions related to the economics of the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.  From the perspective of economic analysis, this case 
is simply about information asymmetries among parties in the market and the use of informative 
labels as a Technical Barrier to Trade.  
What are the fundamental economic features of this case?  
Consumers in the United States purchase tuna produced in both the United States and Mexico. 
Although consumers cannot distinguish any observable difference between tuna caught in 
different locations or by different methods, some American consumers place a higher moral 
value on tuna caught using a specific technique that does not harm dolphins.  Moreover, this 
dolphin-loving group of Americans is willing to pay a higher price in the market for a product 
that meets its higher ethical standards. While dolphin-loving consumers are highly concerned 
with animal welfare, it should be noted that dolphins are not endangered and thus, do not fall 
under universally accepted standards for special protection.  
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In response to this concern for dolphin welfare among tuna-eating consumers, the US 
government created a voluntary labeling program in which tuna fishermen could have their 
catches certified as “dolphin-safe.” This certification is costly to fisherman, but allows their 
product to be marketed in the US with an informative label that makes their product appealing to 
dolphin-lovers.  Mexico made two important complaints about the US program. First, they 
claimed that the US labeling program was altering conditions of market competition to the 
detriment of Mexican producers of tuna. Second, they argued that an alternative labeling 
program which they favored and which essentially set a lower standard for dolphin care, should 
be allowed to co-exist in the US market.  
The important legal questions raised in this case have already been analyzed in section 2. In this 
section, we provide an economic analysis. As noted in section 2.3, the panel’s finding concerning 
the universe of like products was not appealed by the US. Thus, from a legal perspective, the AB 
can be excused for not doing its own analysis of likeness.  However, the way in which the panel 
defined the universe of like products is questionable given the underlying facts. As will be 
discussed below, from an economic efficiency perspective, in order to correctly analyze the 
conditions of market competition, it is necessary to begin with an accurate definition of the 
relevant markets. Thus,  our discussion of three key problems for economic analysis will at times 
go beyond the narrow scope of the problem directly before the AB to examine the case 
normatively.  
1. What constitutes "modifying conditions of market competition"? Further, how should Panels 
and the AB assess the extent to which conditions of market competition have been modified?  
2. What are the welfare costs of a technical barrier to trade and who bears these costs?  
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3. When consumers value information regarding an internationally trade product, who should 
provide this information and who should choose the agent for provision of information?   
 
3.1 Does the TBT modify conditions of market competition?  
 
Beginning with the first question, the Appellate Body reviewed the question of whether the opt-
in labeling program run by the US modified the conditions of competition to the detriment of 
Mexican tuna products. The Appellate Body concluded “it is the measure at issue that modifies 
the competitive conditions in the US market to the detriment of Mexican tuna products.” (para. 
240).  
 
The AB’s analysis begins with a clear statement of the relevant question for the AB to consider, 
“whether governmental action ‘affects the conditions under which like goods, domestic and 
imported, compete in the market within a Member’s territory’” (para. 236). The AB then drew a 
comparison to a case, Korea-Various Measures on Beef, in which the government’s intervention 
into the market was fundamentally different from that in Tuna-Dolphin II. In the Korean beef 
case, the government imposed restrictions on retail outlets for beef. Essentially, by indirectly 
restricting access of foreign products to the domestic distribution network, the government 
directly inhibited competition between foreign and domestic beef. There is almost no similarity 
to the current case and it is hard to understand why the AB drew this parallel. In Tuna-Dolphin 
II, the government intervention is simply to create an informative label that designates whether a 
product, produced domestically or abroad, meets a specific “high-quality” standard.  
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A better approach to addressing the issue of market competition is to begin by determining 
whether the varieties of tuna products available for sale in the US are all part of one large 
indistinguishable “tuna market” or whether there are distinct markets for different types of tuna.  
The fundamental features of the case suggest that there are at least two, and perhaps three, 
specific types of tuna that meet the preferences of US consumers to different degrees. The first 
type, which meets the US labeling requirements, could be called “high ethical quality”; the 
second type, which meets the AIDCP labeling requirements favored by Mexico, could be called 
“moderate ethical quality”; and the third type could be called “no ethical quality.” All three types 
presumably satisfy all physical standards of food safety. The economic problem in the tuna 
market is that different types of consumers prefer different types of tuna. Thus, in the absence of 
any labeling regime, all types of tuna are pooled into one unified market in which consumers 
who prefer “high ethical quality” or “moderate ethical quality” cannot have their preferences 
satisfied. In this case, the utility value that consumers ascribe to the different goods depends 
upon the value they place on the production process used, rather than any physical attribute of 
the good that eventually would be observable. Because consumers generally cannot observe the 
actual production process, but obtain utility from their beliefs about this unobservable feature, 
goods of this nature are known as credence goods.  
 
In the absence of any correction of the information problem, one would expect that the US tuna 
market would exhibit a form of the classical “lemons problem” (Akerlof, 1970). Because higher 
ethical quality (and consequently, higher cost) products could not be identified, the market would 
be dominated by items of no ethical quality and consumers who prefer higher ethical quality 
items would simply stop purchasing any tuna.  
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The standard solution to this type of market failure is to create either a public or private costly 
system of quality verification.10 It is necessary that quality verification be costly because if there 
is no cost associated with proving quality, the low quality producers will attempt to mimic high 
quality producers with the result that the labeling system would have no value.  
 
In light of this brief analysis of the information problem extant in the US tuna market, the AB’s 
conclusion is questionable.  Economic models of credence goods typically assume goods that are 
differentiated on unobservable processes embody different values.11 The prices paid for them, or 
their market worth, differ from the inherent value to the consumer unless the information 
problem is corrected. Under this framework, US governmental action to create labels is not 
modifying the conditions of market competition between like goods. Rather, the governmental 
action is correcting a market failure associated with the pooling of dissimilar goods into a single 
market. Therefore, the opt-in labeling program is strengthening the functioning of markets for all 
varieties of tuna.  
 
This analysis presumes that there are, in fact, multiple markets for tuna products based on 
consumers’ perceptions of the ethical quality of the production process. But, as an empirical 
question, how can and should a Panel or Appellate Body identify the boundaries of a “market?” 
What evidence would support a conclusion that there multiple differentiated tuna markets?  
                                                            
10 See Roe, Brian and Ian Sheldon Hicks (2007), “Credence Good Labeling: The Efficiency and Distributional 
Implications of Several Policy Approaches,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 89(4): 1020-1033. 
11 Roe, Brian and Ian Sheldon Hicks (2007), “Credence Good Labeling: The Efficiency and Distributional 
Implications of Several Policy Approaches,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 89(4): 1020-1033 
and Grolleau, Gilles and Julie A. Caswell (2006), “Interaction Between Food Attributes in Markets: The Case 
of Environmental Labeling,” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 31(3); 471-484, both begin 
with this premise.  
40 
 
Should the analysis focus on the demand side of the market, the supply side, or both? Ultimately, 
this will depend on the particular features of a case.12 
 
In Tuna-Dolphin II, which centers around a government’s desire to address consumer well-being, 
it seems natural to begin with the demand side of the market. The first question - does each 
variety of tuna constitute its own market – can be addressed by estimating consumer demand for 
each variety. While detailed data on prices and quantities of “dolphin-safe”, “AIDCP-dolphin-
safe” and “not dolphin safe” tuna are not available to the general public, grocery store chains in 
the United States regularly collect this data.13  
 
Economists routinely estimate a parameter of consumers’ demand functions known as the 
elasticity of substitution. This parameter captures how the quantity demanded of a specific 
product will respond to an increase in the price. More precisely, it reports the decline in the 
quantity demanded, expressed as a percent, in response to a 1% increase in the price. A product 
with an elasticity of 5 will experience a 5% decline in the quantity demanded by consumers if its 
price rises by 1%. Generally speaking, a product with a low elasticity14 is more highly valued by 
consumers in the sense that a moderately high increase in the price will result in only a small 
change in the quantity consumed. Items with lower substitution elasticities would include 
medications, higher quality goods, and more finely differentiated goods.  
 
                                                            
12 The Korean beef case cited above, which involved measures related to distribution of the products in question, 
seems to call for an analysis that focuses on the supply side of the market.  
13 See Teisl, Mario F., Brian Roe, and Robert L. Hicks (2002), “Can Eco-Labels Tune a Market?  Evidence 
from Dolphin-Safe Labeling,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43(3): 339–359, who 
use panel data from A.C. Nielson to estimate tuna demand before and after the advent of dolphin-safe 
labeling in the United States.  
14 Note that any product with a “low elasticity of demand” can also be described as “inelastically demanded.” 
Conversely, “high elasticity of demand” products have “elastic demand.” 
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Consider what can be learned about markets for different tuna products by examining elasticities 
of import demand in the US. Soderbery (2013) provides estimates of import demand for different 
varieties of tuna in the US using publically available data at the HS10 tariff-line level. He finds 
that  canned tuna excluding albacore (HS10 code 1604141010) has a very high elasticity of 47.14 
while a related product, canned albacore tuna (HS10 code 1604141091) has a  lower, yet still 
quite high, elasticity of substitution of 9.32. In the markets for these two products, producers 
must compete intensely because even a small increase in the price will lead consumers to 
dramatically reduce the quantity they will buy. See figure 1 in which a small increase in the price 
from the equilibrium value of P* to P’ is associated with a large decline in quantity consumed 
from Q* to Q’. This is a common feature of commodity markets with little differentiation across 
goods.  Markups, the increase in the price over the producers’ marginal production costs, are 
often razor thin.   
 
[Insert Figure 1 here]. 
 
By way of contrast, consumer demand for frozen tuna is relatively inelastic. Frozen albacore tuna 
(HS10 code 0303410000) and frozen yellowfin tuna (HS10 code 0303420060) have estimated 
elasticities of only 2.74 and 1.42, respectively. For these products, price changes induce little 
change in the quantity demanded by consumers. See figure 2. A substantial increase in the price 
from P* to P’ is associated with only a small decline in the quantity demanded from Q* to Q’.  
Producers thus have pricing power;  the degree of competition is lower and producers can charge 
a comfortable markup over marginal cost.    
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[Insert Figure 2 here]. 
 
These import demand elasticities for different varieties of tuna at the tariff-line level provide 
evidence that there are a number of distinct markets for tuna, and that the conditions of market 
competition vary considerably across these different goods.  Further, for canned tuna, the 
extremely high elasticities of consumer demand provide evidence that competition is so intense 
that even very small increases in production costs would likely force some producers to exit the 
market.  
 
Unfortunately, the most disaggregated products described in the US Harmonized system tariff 
schedule do not differentiate tuna according to the “ethical quality” of the production process 
used.  Thus, an analysis based on import demand elasticities at the tariff-line level cannot draw 
conclusions regarding whether or not “US dolphin-safe” tuna, “AIDCP safe” tuna or “no ethical 
quality” tuna are regarded as different goods by consumers. However, the same methodology 
used by Soderbery could have been used by the AB or by either party to the case to determine 
whether there is one unified market for tuna of different ethical qualities or several distinct 
markets.   
 
In the AB’s analysis of whether the “dolphin-safe” labeling program modifies conditions of 
market competition (paragraphs 233-240), they abstract away from any analysis of what 
constitutes the market. Rather than beginning with an assessment of the boundaries of the 
different markets for tuna, they inherently assume the existence of a single unified tuna market. 
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They then concur with the Panel that it is the label, not the inherent quality of the different 
products embodied in consumer preferences, that confers an “advantage in the US market.”  
 
This conclusion of the AB is consistent with a view that a dolphin-safe label provides a valuable 
service – i.e., independent third party verification of the dolphin-safe process – which is bundled 
together with the high ethical quality variety. Thus, a can of dolphin-friendly tuna with a label 
backed by third party verification is worth more to consumers than a can with the same inherent 
qualities, but without the independent verification of those qualities.  This line of reasoning leads 
to the further conclusion that it is the “lack of access15 to the ‘dolphin-safe’ label of tuna 
products containing tuna caught by setting on dolphins has a detrimental impact on the 
competitive opportunities of Mexican tuna products in the US market.”   
 
However, as noted above, the standard economic framework for analyzing information problems 
of credence goods treats a quality-validating label as a  mechanism that facilitates the correct 
valuation of the good, rather than as a valuable product attribute in its own right.  
This suggests that the AB’s finding is flawed by its failure to assess the underlying competitive 
conditions of the market. As the import demand elasticities provided by Soderbery suggest, 
higher quality types of tuna have lower demand elasticities and, consequently, higher markups 
and higher prices. The lower quality varieties of tuna face highly elastic consumer demand in the 
US.  
 
                                                            
15 Note that here “lack of access” refers to Mexican producers’ inability to comply with the label’s requisite 
standards, NOT that Mexican producers are unable to apply for the label.  
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If the AB had conducted an economic analysis of the tuna markets in the US, it seems very likely 
that they would have found that Mexican producers of moderate ethical quality AIDCP-labeled 
tuna and unlabeled tuna face very high demand elasticities in the US market.  If so, then these 
higher demand elasticities would imply lower markups, lower prices and lower profitability. 
Under this view, the only logical conclusion would be that the detrimental impact on Mexican 
producers of the US program arises because the Mexicans sell a different, and inferior, good.  
 
As a final point, the AB’s finding (para. 407(b)) that the US program is inconsistent with Article 
2.1 relies upon an assumption that “dolphin-safe” and unlabeled tuna are like products. Given 
that the empirical evidence from consumer demand likely rejects this assumption, the AB’s 
finding is based upon a false premise.  While the US did not claim that “dolphin-safe” and other 
products served distinct markets, it is still problematic from an efficiency perspective that the 
conclusions were likely based on an incorrect assumption.  
 
3.2 The welfare costs of a TBT 
 
Turning next to our second question, we consider the welfare costs of a technical barrier to trade.  
The legal analysis of the case considered whether the US’s “dolphin-safe” program was a 
“technical regulation” or a “standard” under the TBT Agreement, whether compliance was 
mandatory, whether the program “regulates in a binding fashion,” etc. (Paragraphs 11-18). The 
legal analysis also included extensive discussion of the “legitimate objective” of the regulation.  
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In contrast, an economic analysis of the program simply focuses on the impact of the regulation 
(under any name) on consumer and producer welfare.16  
 
As a first point of departure from the AB’s legal analysis, we begin by observing that while 
promoting dolphin-welfare was one objective of the US’s program, another important objective 
of the program was to provide information to consumers that they found valuable.  If we take 
information provision to consumer’s as the primary objective of the US’s policy, then what does 
this imply about the welfare consequences of the program’s design? Is the best program a 
mandatory one? A voluntary one?  
 
If we wish to assess informative labeling regimes, the first question to consider is “who should 
bear the cost of a labeling system?”  
 
To simplify the analysis, suppose for the moment that there are two varieties of a product 
available in market, a “high ethical quality” good and a “low ethical quality” good and that the 
higher quality good faces a relatively inelastic consumer demand whereas the low quality good 
faces relatively elastic demand.  
 
A voluntary labeling regime whereby it is costly to acquire a “high ethical quality” label would 
involve some fee be paid (directly or indirectly) by producers of the high quality variety who 
desire the label for their product. Nothing would be required of low quality producers.  
                                                            
16 This section builds upon ideas laid out in Howse (2013 – check year) “Consumer Labeling on Trial at the WTO: 
Misunderstanding the Behavioral Law and Economics of Consumer Information.”  
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Alternatively, a mandatory system would require both high and low quality producers pay a fee 
or incur a cost.  
 
In order to evaluate the efficiency and fairness of both the voluntary and the mandatory regimes, 
we must first understand who bears the cost burden of the regulation, not in an accounting sense, 
but in a welfare sense. To do this, we can rely on the methods used in evaluating the burdens of 
tax policy. Thus, the elasticities of demand and supply for both the high ethical quality good and 
low ethical quality good will determine who bears the welfare cost of the regulation.  
 
Consider first a voluntary labeling regime in which producers can choose whether or not to 
obtain a label that certifies their product as “high ethical quality” for a fee. If consumer group 
one, the “dolphin-lovers,” prefers high ethical quality tuna and has a relatively inelastic demand 
for high quality, then they will bear most of the cost of the labeling regime. See figure 3. Any fee 
required of producers, represented by the vertical height of the double-headed red arrow,  will be 
largely passed through to consumers as a higher price they will pay, P’d. Producers will receive a 
lower price, P’s. However, the fraction of the total fee born by consumers, which is the ratio of 
the height of the green arrow to the height of the red arrow, is substantially larger than the 
fraction of the fee born by producers, the ratio of the height of the orange line to the height of the 
red arrow. With regard to fairness, this seems to be a reasonably good outcome because the 
group that values the information provided by the label is the group that pays the cost of the 
information. Of course, there will still be some "marginal" consumers and producers who would 
like to buy and sell the high quality good, but will be forced to exit the market under this costly 
labeling system. These exiting agents are represented by the horizontal distance Q*-Q’. But, 
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given the assumption of inelastic demand, the dead weight loss under this program, represented 
by the triangle with coordinates (Q*, P*), (Q’, P’s) and (Q’, P’d), would be small.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 here]. 
 
Next consider a mandatory labeling regime in which all producers must pay a fee to sell in the 
market. See figure 4. After producers pay the fee, represented by the vertical height of the red 
arrow in panels A and B, their goods will be certified as “high ethical quality” or “low ethical 
quality.” Further suppose that consumer group two, “dolphin-indifferent consumers,” places no 
value on tuna fishing methods, but has highly elastic demand for tuna.  Then, a mandatory 
labeling system that raises production costs for all producers, those providing high quality in 
panel A and low quality in panel B, could potentially have large negative welfare consequences. 
In the low quality market, the cost of the regulation would be largely born by the producers of 
low quality, rather than consumers. In panel B, the producers’ cost share of the regulation is the 
ratio of the heights of the orange arrow and red arrow.  The price that low quality producers 
receive, P’s, is substantially reduced by the labeling fee. More importantly, the existence of the 
regulation and the cost it imposes would induce a large number of marginal consumers and 
producers to exit the market for low ethical quality tuna. This exit is represented by the 
horizontal distance, Q*-Q’ in panel B. Moreover, the dead weight loss in the low-quality market, 
represented by the triangle with coordinates (Q*, P*), (Q’, P’s) and (Q’, P’d), is substantial.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 here]. 
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This suggests that a voluntary labeling regime that charges producers of the inelastically 
demanded variety (i.e., high ethical quality tuna) a cost for participation would be welfare-
superior to a mandatory labeling regime that spreads the burden evenly across all producers. It 
further suggests that, if we compare a regime of voluntary labeling of high quality to a regime of 
mandatory labeling in which all producers must share the cost of the regulation, it is the 
voluntary regime that has the smallest adverse impact on the low-quality producers who face an 
elastic demand curve. Under the mandatory regime, many low-quality producers would exit and 
the ones that continue to operate would bear the larger cost share of the labeling regime.  
 
Altogether, this suggests that the US’s voluntary program of labeling likely had the smallest 
negative impact on low quality Mexican producers of any program that satisfied the objective of 
informing consumers about product quality. By creating a program that allowed Mexican 
producers to abstain from participation, the US introduced no unnecessary welfare costs into the 
market for “low ethical quality” tuna.  
 
Interestingly, the conclusion to be drawn from an economic analysis of the welfare costs is that 
the domestic body which has the right to regulate, the US government, actually chose to 
implement the regulation in such a way as to minimize the adverse welfare consequences to 
foreign producers.  The welfare analysis amplifies the legal arguments made in Howse’s Amicus 
Curiae Submission to the AB17  - not only is the right to regulate a foundational principle that 
informs the balance of rights and obligations in the WTO system, but the execution of the right 
by a national government can potentially lead to more globally efficient policies.  
 
                                                            
17 Howse, Robert. February 17, 2012. Paragraphs 8 and 9.  
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3.3 Who should provide information that enhances consumer welfare?  
 
The discussion of welfare costs leads us to a series of related empirical questions about provision 
of information to consumers.  First, what is the optimal quantity of information that should be 
provided to consumers? Second, what entity – a domestic national government, a foreign 
national government, an international standards body, a private association of producers or 
retailers, a private consumer watchdog, or the WTO – should provide the information? Finally, 
what entity should decide who provides the desired information?  
 
In the Tuna-Dolphin II case, Mexico contended that “both the AIDCP dolphin-safe standard and 
the US dolphin-safe standard could co-exist, each subject to its own labeling requirements” 
(para. 47). Setting aside the fact that the proposal for multiple labels came from Mexico, what 
are the economic merits of the Mexican proposal?  
 
Suppose that the US tuna market consists of several products of differing quality, as described in 
section 3.1. In this environment, the Mexican suggestion to allow for labels that indicate 
different levels of quality – high, medium and low - could yield greater welfare than a regime of 
only two quality grades – high and low. The optimal number of quality gradations must be 
determined empirically and involves tradeoffs. On the one hand, if information is costless, 
economic efficiency would favor a large or infinite number of labels that provides to each 
consumer the precise information that enables the consumer to choose her most preferred variety.  
However, because information is costly to provide, the optimal number of quality gradations is 
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finite, and likely quite low.18 Moreover, even if information is costless to provide, a wealth of 
recent  work in economics has documented anomalies or irrational choices by consumers which 
suggest that consumers often fail to correctly process all available information regarding product 
attributes.19 If consumers face too much information, then this excess information can lead to 
confusion. Consequently, confused consumers could choose products that do not best satisfy 
their preferences.  
 
To summarize, in comparing two different policy proposals -- the Mexican proposal for co-
existence of multiple labels versus the US’s program of two quality grades --  it is not clear 
which policy yields higher welfare. An empirical evaluation of the two policy options requires 
that the policy maker be informed about consumer preferences over different varieties (e.g., 
through demand elasticities) and about consumers’ abilities to process any information provided 
by a labeling regime.  The choice of a policy must balance the gains of greater information 
against the costs of greater information.  
 
This leads to us to the two related questions mentioned previously – who should provide the 
information and who should decide who provides the information.   
 
Economic analysis provides no uniform rule regarding which entities should provide information 
to consumers. There are examples of information provision from a wide variety of agents. When 
                                                            
18 Roe, Brian and Ian Sheldon Hicks (2007), “Credence Good Labeling: The Efficiency and Distributional 
Implications of Several Policy Approaches,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 89(4): 1020-1033 
compare efficiency under both discrete and continuous labels.  
19 Campbell, Jackson, Madrian and Tufano (2011), “Consumer Financial Protection,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 25(1): 91-113, survey the literature on consumer choices over financial products. Fehr, Ernst and 
Antonio Rangel (2011), “Neuroeconomic Foundations of Economic Choices – Recent Advances,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 25(4): 3-30 describe the efforts to understand problems of complex consumer decision-
making using neuroeconomics.  
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product quality directly affects human health, as in food or drug safety, the US government 
typically fills the role of quality regulator and information provider for US consumers. At the 
other extreme, during the recent scandal in China over life-threatening contamination of 
powdered baby milk, Chinese consumers lost faith in their domestic regulators and have sought 
to purchase foreign-produced baby milk because they have greater faith in the effectiveness of 
foreign regulators to safeguard human health.  Between these extremes, we observe consumer-
funded groups providing quality ratings for goods and services ranging from autos and 
electronics to hair stylists and plumbers while “independent,” private ratings agencies (that rely 
on income from producers) are responsible for assessing the quality of bonds and other financial 
instruments that trade in the US. Ultimately, the choice of an entity to provide information 
depends upon the nature of the product, the costliness of providing information and the incentive 
structure that induces the most truthful revelations about a product.  
 
This leads to the question of who should choose the regulator.  
 
The preamble to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade clearly places the right to 
regulate under a national authority. Economic efficiency would support this placement on the 
grounds that consumer welfare is best served when a government chosen by consumers is 
responsible for establishing regulations.  
 
This implies that the Panel’s decision to give itself the right to choose the regulator by advancing 
the proposed Mexican labeling scheme over that of the US appears wrong from an economic as 
well as a legal viewpoint. Thus, the AB’s finding that the Panel erred by concluding that the US 
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labeling program was more trade restrictive than necessary enhances economic efficiency to the 
extent that it returns the right to establish a regulation back to the national government which is 
best positioned to advance the objective of consumer welfare.  
 
 Conclusion 
 
Our legal analysis of Tuna-Dolphin II…. 
 
The economic analysis of Tuna-Dolphin II examined three questions: (1) how should a WTO 
body determine whether a technical barrier to trade (TBT) modifies conditions of market 
competition, (2) who bears the welfare costs of a TBT, and (3) who should provide valuable 
information to consumers. We suggest that an empirically accurate like-product determination is 
a necessary first step in analyzing market competition; in some cases, consumer demand 
elasticities will be highly informative to judicial authorities. Further, demand elasticities can aid 
judicial authorities in understanding the distributional consequences of regulations. Lastly, 
consumer information is provided by many different agents and institutions within an economy – 
the best agent or institution for providing information will tend to be the one facing the strongest 
incentives for truthful revelation.  
  
53 
 
References 
 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, 
WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002, DSR 2002:VIII, 3359. 
 
Akerlof, George A. (1970). “The Maket for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3): 488-500.  
 
Campbell, Jackson, Madrian and Tufano (2011), “Consumer Financial Protection,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 25(1): 91-113, survey the literature on consumer choices over financial 
products.  
 
Fehr, Ernst and Antonio Rangel (2011), “Neuroeconomic Foundations of Economic Choices – 
Recent Advances,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(4): 3-30. 
 
Howse, Robert. February 17, 2012. Paragraphs 8 and 9. 
 
Howse and Levy, 2013 
Howse and Langille, “Permitting Pluralism”, Yale Journal of International Law, 2012.)Grolleau, 
Gilles and Julie A. Caswell (2006), “Interaction Between Food Attributes in Markets: The 
Case of Environmental Labeling,” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 31(3); 
471-484.  
 
Roe, Brian and Ian Sheldon Hicks (2007), “Credence Good Labeling: The Efficiency and 
Distributional Implications of Several Policy Approaches,” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 89(4): 1020-1033. 
 
Soderbery, Anson. (2013) “Estimating Import Supply and Demand Elasticities: Analysis and 
Implications,” Purdue University Mimeo.  
 
Teisl, Mario F., Brian Roe, and Robert L. Hicks (2002), “Can Eco-Labels Tune a Market?  
Evidence from Dolphin-Safe Labeling,” Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 43(3): 339–359, 
Wijkstrom and McDaniels (para. 3.24) 
  
54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Price 
Quantity
Supply 
Demand 
Q’             Q*
P* 
P’
Figure 1: Market equilibrium with elastic demand
55 
 
 
  
Price 
Quantity
Supply
Demand
Q’ Q*
P* 
P’ 
Figure 2: Market equilibrium with inelastic demand
56 
 
 
 
  
Price 
Quantity
Supply 
Inelastic 
Demand
Q’ Q*
P* 
P’d 
P’s 
Supply plus labeling fee 
Figure 3: The welfare burden of a voluntary labeling program  
57 
 
 
 
                                                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
Price 
Quantity
Supply
Inelastic 
Demand 
Q’ Q* 
P* 
P’d 
P’s 
Supply plus 
labeling fee 
Price 
Quantity 
Supply 
Elastic 
Demand
Q’            Q* 
P* 
P’d
P’s 
Supply plus 
labeling fee 
Figure 4: The welfare burden of a mandatory labeling program 
Panel A: The inelastically demanded variety   Panel B: The elastically demanded variety 
